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Framing the Problem and Making Decisions: 
The Facts are Not Enough 
DENNIS DUCHON, KENNETH J. DUNEGAN, AND SIDNEY L. BARTON 
Abstract-One hundred ten engineers, scientists, and managers in a 
high-technology international engineering firm took part in an experi- 
ment that assessed the effect of framing on an R&D financial allocation 
decision. Subtle changes in frame of reference are found to have a 
powerful effect on decisions and perception of risk. R&D management 
implications are discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
HOICES and the explanation of choices made in R&D C management-why certain projects are selected, why they 
are funded at a given level, and why they are terminated-are 
often assumed to have a rational basis. Although what exactly 
constitutes that rational basis has been much debated, there is 
general agreement that rational choice should satisfy some 
elementary requirements of consistency and coherence [7]. 
Yet Tversky and Kahneman [7] have demonstrated that 
people often systematically violate requirements of consist- 
ency and coherence. These violations come as a result of 
decision makers adopting different frames for their decisions. 
Frames refer to the decision maker’s conception of the acts, 
outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular 
choice. The adoption of a given frame depends not only on the 
personal characteristics of the decision maker, but also on the 
formulation of the problem itself. Thus, objective facts can 
take on different meaning when framed differently. Specifi- 
cally, different formulations of a decision problem using the 
same objective facts can lead to different decisions. Consider, 
for example, a financial allocation decision for a project that is 
going badly. Does the project manager “see” the project’s 
future potential, or does he or she “see” the difficulties. 
Whether or not the project continues to be funded will depend 
in part on how it is seen, that is, in how the objective facts are 
framed or presented. 
The present experiment manipulates very subtly the framing 
of an R&D financial allocation decision. Framing has been 
shown to influence the decisions of student subjects who work 
at abstract decision-making tasks [5]. This study extends the 
examination of framing effects by using experienced organiza- 
tional decision makers who make a decision that is apropos of 
their work life. Framing would indeed be a potent factor in 
R&D management decision making if engineers, scientists, 
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and engineering managers are subject to its influence. The data 
analysis reported below even takes into account the degree to 
which subjects see themselves as rational versus intuitive 
decision makers. This self-perception thus allows us to take 
into account a personal characteristic which might lead to 
differences in choice [7]. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
One hundred ten professional employees of a high-technol- 
ogy international engineering firm took part in the experiment. 
Fifty-two of the subjects hold a bachelor’s degree, 51 hold a 
master’s degree, and seven hold a Ph.D. Subjects represent 
both managerial and technical personnel, although 76 percent 
of the sample are engineers or scientists. The sample is 
predominately male (98 males, 8 females, and 4 subjects for 
whom gender data are not available). The sample on average is 
33.8 years of age, has 5.2 years of experience with the firm, 
and supervises 2.7 people. Subjects also represent different 
nationalities including English, Japanese, French, and Ger- 
man, although most of the subjects (69 percent) are citizens of 
the United States. 
Procedure and Manipulation 
Subjects read the following financial allocation scenario: 
As R&D manager, one of your project teams has come to 
you requesting an additional $100 OOO in funds for a project 
you instituted several months ago. The project is already 
behind schedule and over budget, but the team still believes it 
can be successfully completed. You currently have $500 OOO 
remaining in your budget unallocated, but which must carry 
you for the rest of the fiscal year. Lowering the balance by an 
additional $100 OOO might jeopardize flexibility to respond to 
other opportunities. 
Evaluating the situation, you believe there is a fair chance 
the project will not succeed, in which case the additional 
funding would be lost; if successful, however, the money 
would be well spent . . . 
The last sentence of the scenario for subjects randomly 
assigned to one frame (Frame 1) condition read: “Of the 
projects undertaken by the team, 30 of the last 50 have been 
successful.” The last sentence of the scenario for subjects 
randomly assigned to the other frame (Frame 2) condition read: 
“Of the projects undertaken by this team, 20 of the last 50 
have been unsuccessful.” Note that, statistically, the team’s 
success ratio is 60 percent in both cases. 
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The wording for the framing conditions in both cases was 
adapted from Davis and Bobko [ 2 ] .  Note that the framing 
conditions are subtle but offer different reference points for the 
decision problem. Furthermore, as an assessment of the 
decision problem’s face validity, three members of the 
company’s top management reviewed the scenario and unani- 
mously agreed it represented a decision the subjects would 
understand and may reasonably encounter on their jobs. 
CO variate 
Because the issue of “rational” choice is important, and 
because the sample is assumed to have a “rational” disposi- 
tion due to training and experience, an assessment of the 
subjects’ perception of their disposition toward rational 
decision making was made. Lee [5]  has argued that it is useful 
to describe people along a continuum of rationality; therefore, 
subjects gave a self-assessment of themselves as either rational 
or intuitive decision makers by responding on a seven-point 
scale to a question which asked, “In general, do you consider 
yourself to be . . . ” The seven-point scale was anchored by 1 = 
a rational decision maker and 7 = an intuitive decision maker. 
The scale anchors were chosen to reflect fundamentally 
different decision-making approaches: a rational approach 
(i.e., systematic, objective, logical) and an intuitive approach 
(i.e., attaining cognition without evident systematic thought). 
The term “irrational” is not an appropriate opposite anchor 
for “rational” because it has a strong pejorative connotation. 
Intuitive, on the other hand, does suggest a process very 
different from rational, but one which does not carry an 
undesirable connotation. 
The average response was 3.3 (i.e., on the “rational” side 
of the scale). The standard deviation (SD) was 1.44, and 
responses ranged from 1 to 7. This self-perception report was 
used as a covariate in portions of the analyses to control for 
disposition toward rationality which may have altered re- 
sponses independent of framing conditions. 
Dependent Measures 
After reading the scenario, subjects indicated the likelihood 
they would fund the request by selecting from alternatives on 
the following five-point scale: 
~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~~ 
Lean T o w a r d  Lean T o w a r d  
Reject Rejecting Uncertain Funding Fund 
~~~~ ~ ~~ ~~~~ ~~~ 
1 2 3 4 5 
~~~~ ~~ 
~~~~~ ~~~~~~ 
In addition to indicating whether or not they would fund the 
project, subjects were asked to indicate the level of risk they 
believed was associated with providing the additional funding. 
If framing alters the psychology of decision making by altering 
perception of the problem, then it seems likely that framing is 
also altering the decision maker’s perception of the risk she or 
he is taking when making the decision. Rational decision 
makers are not people who take chances just for the thrill of it. 
Rather, rational decision makers are likely risk avoiders or 
risk minimizers who make decisions consistent with their 
perception of risk in the decision-making episode. Therefore, 
T A B L E  I 
INCLINATION T O  G R A N T  ADDITIONAL FUNDING BY FRAME 
CONDITIONS ’ 
3 
V a r I a b I e F 
Frame 1 3 . 9 7  Frame 13.85*** 
Frame 2 3 50  Rationality .07 
’ H i g h e r  n u m b e r  i n d i c a t e s  s t r o n g e r  i n c l i n a t i o n  to g r a n t  a d d i t i o n a l  f u n d i n g .  
p < , 0 0 1  * * *  
as framing changes perceptions of the decision-making prob- 
lem, so too will it change perceptions of the risk in the 
problem. Subjects responded to a scale item in which they 
indicated the degree of risk they believed associated with 
additional funding: 1 = No risk, 2 = Some risk, 3 = Normal 
risk, 4 = Considerable risk, 5 = Too risky. 
RESULTS 
Data Analysis 
Table I reports the inclination that subjects would fund the 
request in the decision scenario. Subjects in Frame 1 indicate a 
stronger inclination to fund the project than subjects in Frame 2 
(average response Frame 1 ,  3.97 versus 3.50 for Frame 2 ) .  
When inclination to fund the request is used as the dependent 
variable in a one-way analysis of covariance (with degree of 
rationality used as the covariate), significant differences are 
indicated in the dependent variable (F  = 1.95, p < 0.05, R 2  
= 0.19). Examination of the variables in the model indicate a 
significant effect for framing (F = 1 3 . 8 5 , ~  < 0.001), but not 
for the covariate (F  = 0.07, ns). Thus, even when controlling 
for possible differences in degree of rationality for presumably 
very “rational” decision makers, framing effects are found. 
Therefore, framing and not degree of rationality accounts for 
differences in behavior in this study. 
Framing is also related to perception of risk. When asked to 
report the degree of risk they perceive in the decision scenario, 
the average response of subjects in Frame 1 is 3.01 (SD = 
0.68), while the average response of subjects in Frame 2 is 
3.34 (SD = 0.64). These responses are significantly different 
(t  = 2.54, p < 0.05). Thus, the subtle frame of reference 
manipulation affected perceptions of objective risk. It can also 
be noted that the correlation between perception of risk and 
inclination to fund the request is - 0.21 ( p < 0.05). That is, 
subjects who see greater risk in the scenario are less likely to 
fund the request. Thus, framing not only changed the 
perception of objective risk in the project, but also led to 
differences in an inclination to fund the project. 
DISCUSSION 
This paper reports the results of an experiment in which a 
sample of experienced engineers, scientists, and managers- 
people who would be expected to be objective decision 
makers, and who report themselves to be rational decision 
makers-are influenced by very subtle informational cues. 
These subtle cues did not alter the object facts in an R&D 
financial allocation decision, but they did apparently alter the 
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decision maker’s reference point. The cues also apparently 
altered the degree of risk perceived in the decision scenario. 
As a result, the decision makers exposed to different frames 
made different decisions, and reported perceiving different 
levels of risk in the decision episode. 
The data presented in this paper clearly demonstrate that 
knowing “just the facts” in a decision-making situation is 
insufficient for predicting choice. Understanding choice re- 
quires an understanding of the decision maker’s frame of 
reference. Different frames of reference can lead to different 
choices because different reference frames lead to different 
interpretations of what the facts mean. This by no means 
implies that the decision makers in this experiment acted 
“irrationally.” The decision makers in this experiment were 
quite “rational” from at least one view of consistency because 
those perceiving the decision to continue funding to be a risky 
one were less inclined to fund than those perceiving the 
decision to be less risky. Yet those choosing either to fund or 
not to fund were operating with the same objective facts. That 
is, the same facts still lead to inconsistent choices. This 
suggests that it is unwise to assume that even experienced 
engineers, scientists, and managers can reliably achieve a 
unitary interpretation of the facts. 
Several explanations have been offered for why framing the 
facts in different ways can lead to different decisions. 
Kahneman and Tversky’s [4] prospect theory posits that 
framing differences lead to systematic differences in the way 
decision makers process and edit information. These process- 
ing and editing differences lead to different choices. Arkes and 
Blumer [l] have elaborated on certain aspects of prospect 
theory by arguing that decision makers in a situation similar to 
the one captured in our decision scenario are responding to 
sunk costs. That is, the psychological weight of the commit- 
ment of money, time, and effort that goes into a decision 
represent costs that are sunk into the decision, costs which are 
difficult, even impossible, to ignore when later the decision 
appears to have been a bad one. Rather than reversing oneself, 
Arkes and Blumer [ 11 contend that the decision maker does not 
want to appear wasteful of the money, time, and effort already 
spent; and so she or he will continue to fund a project, even 
though objectively such funding may not be defensible. These 
explanations are valuable, but the mechanisms of the psychol- 
ogy of decision making are imperfectly understood and future 
research is needed, especially research focusing on real 
decision makers, not only to explore the mechanisms of 
framing but also to explore the kinds of reference points 
decision makers adopt. 
Although the underlying mechanisms of framing are not 
perfectly understood, several implications for R&D manage- 
ment can be drawn from this study. First, managers need to 
realize that the “facts” do not speak for themselves. Rather, 
the facts are interpreted in terms of a frame of reference. Over 
the course of time the norms and social expectations within an 
R&D group can lead to a common set of assumptions about 
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“what we do” and “what we are.” In a sense the group 
adopts a common frame within which all “facts” are 
interpreted. While this process makes certain kinds of com- 
munication easier, it also leads to intellectual blindspots. 
Because of the common frame of reference, the group tends to 
identify and solve the same problems over and over. And there 
are never any questions or doubts because all agree on what 
“facts” mean and the “facts” tell us “we’re doing the only 
thing we can do.” Janis [3], for example, has noted how this 
can happen to highly cohesive decision-making groups. To 
prevent such a problem, management needs to consider 
problems from different points of view or different frames. 
Multiple frames can ensure a less biased view of the “facts” 
associated with a problem and, therefore, better decisions. 
Encouraging the development of different frames of refer- 
ence can also, however, lead to conflict. The conflict will not 
be about “facts,” but rather about “interpretation of facts. ” 
Yet, such conflict can be resolved by having people identify 
the frame of reference they use in understanding the facts. 
Also, conflict can be defused by reminding people that 
multiple reference points are valuable and useful if the 
organization is to remain vital. 
Understanding reference points and risk taking can also help 
managers in the organization. The data in this study suggest 
that describing a project (even a troubled project) in positive 
and hopeful terms (Frame 1) lessens the perceived risk 
associated with that project. Managers can thus generate 
support by using framing to reduce the perceived risks 
associated with their project. 
Frame of reference is an important concept to understand, 
especially for people accustomed to dealing with facts. In 
addition to the facts, the effective R&D manager will be 
sensitive to interpretational differences among people, and be 
aware of how easily frame of reference can be influenced. 
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